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1. Introduction 
In approaching the management of socio-ecological sys-
tems, Holling (1973) distinguished between decisions made 
under “scientific certainty” and decisions where the science 
on which they were based was not clear. In this context, sci-
entific uncertainty arises when more than one model of reality 
is plausible and scientists need more information to differenti-
ate between the utility of the different models employed. Hol-
ling’s distinction between decisions made under conditions 
of scientific certainty and those made where the scientific ba-
sis was less certain led to our current era of trying to manage 
adaptively - to use the results of management actions to im-
prove scientific knowledge and subsequent decisions. Adap-
tive management of socio-ecological systems (SES) refers to 
the feedback process in which decision makers regard policies 
as scientific experiments that generate information improv-
ing the pursuit of long-term goals (Sarewitz, 2000). The use of 
adaptive management is encouraged by advocates when the 
following conditions exist: urgent, high stakes decisions that 
must be made, disputes about the relevant values, and a lack 
of scientific certainty about the consequences of those deci-
sions (Gregory et al., 2006). These conditions are commensu-
rate with those described as requiring “post-normal science” 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991). 
Adaptive management of socio-ecological systems fo-
cuses on iterative decision making under uncertainty (Parma 
and the NCEAS Working Group on Population Management, 
1998) because uncertainty “is fundamental and persistent” in 
policies pertaining to biodiversity and natural resources (Dick-
son and Adams, 2009 110). Iterated decisions provide opportu-
nities to learn, but also for constituencies to enter and exit the 
management process, and for those engaged to alter the value 
sets with which they entered into the process. In other words, 
iteration is a fundamental characteristic of a process intended 
to develop the capacity of the social system to adapt. 
Much of the attention in advancing adaptive management 
is focused on testing hypotheses about system function by im-
proving the quality of evidence derived from the natural world; 
that is, on reducing uncertainty. Still, not all ecological uncer-
tainty can be reduced, let alone eliminated. It is also important 
not to discount the dynamics generated by the interplay of hu-
man values and knowledge leading to interventions in the nat-
ural world. These dynamics are also a source of irreducible un-
certainty because although “… evidence indicates that human 
choices are orderly,” they are “not always rational in the tradi-
tional sense of the word” (Kahneman and Tverskey, 2000 65). If 
human choices are not necessarily rational, then we cannot say 
with certainty at the outset what the outcome will be of nego-
tiations among constituencies responsible for a decision, espe-
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cially among those who do not have a tradition of jointly gen-
erating management recommendations. Lee (1993) referred to 
this source of uncertainty as “management turbulence”; this is 
an attractive image because although the onset of turbulence in 
a fluid is relatively predictable, the actual outcomes are not. 
A helpful initial step in developing a nuanced understanding 
of uncertainty stemming from human induced considerations is 
to place uncertainty in the context of indeterminism and to dis-
tinguish uncertainty from risk. Consequently, we review an in-
fluential, historic distinction between risk and uncertainty and 
introduce three characteristics of indeterminism that are prob-
lematic for SES management. After that, we present three case 
studies illustrating the necessity of appropriately understand-
ing the nature of the uncertainty involved and its implications. 
In the penultimate section, we discuss the three characteristics 
of uncertainty in the context of our case studies to illustrate how 
the prospect of addressing ecological uncertainty does not lay 
the basis for addressing socially induced uncertainty. 
2. Indeterminism, uncertainty and risk 
We use “indeterminism” to refer to all forms of not knowing 
and argue that it is important to recognize that uncertainty is a 
subset of indeterminism. One approach to understanding inde-
terminism and uncertainty specifically has been to classify the 
sources. For example, Regan et al. (2002) distinguished between 
aleatory and epistemic indeterminism. Aleatory indeterminism 
refers to states of reality e what is out there, whether we try to 
describe it or not. Consequently it is irreducible; no amount of 
observation and investigation will diminish it. Epistemic inde-
terminism arises from the limitations of our ability to describe 
reality such as linguistic indeterminism, estimation errors and 
Holling’s (1973) “scientific uncertainty”. Linguistic indetermin-
ism stems from the shortcomings of using language to describe 
reality, such as ambiguity and under specification. Estimation 
errors arise when using statistical tools to estimate probability 
distributions. Holling’s (1973) “scientific uncertainty” occurs 
when there is more than one plausible model of reality and we 
do not know which is correct. Epistemic indeterminism in so-
cio-ecological systems is potentially reducible through ongoing 
efforts to improve our understanding of the dynamics of socio-
ecological systems. Recognizing and communicating epistemic 
indeterminism appropriately in environmental management is 
vital to avoid generating oversimplistic results that do not re-
flect the plurality of possibilities. 
The distinction between aleatory and epistemic indetermin-
ism can be understood through a familiar example: the varia-
tion in the annual amount of rainfall in a river basin. Although 
it might be possible to predict the average rainfall for a basin 
based on past observations, the precise amount that will fall in 
a particular year is unknown. Some of that indeterminism is 
epistemic e if we constructed models of the atmosphere with 
greater spatial and temporal resolution and took many more 
measurements than we do, we could make better predictions 
of annual rainfall. The complex nature of a SES, however, is 
such that there will always be a growing mismatch between 
observation and prediction e the famous “butterfly effect” 
(Hilborn, 2004). Even if it were possible to measure instantly 
the location of every particle in the atmosphere, Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle dictates that we could not then know the 
velocity of those particles. Thus, we can never specify the ini-
tial conditions of the atmosphere exactly, and even the most 
sophisticated simulation of every particle in the atmosphere 
will diverge from observation to a greater and greater extent 
with time. This remaining indeterminism is aleatory and is a 
fundamental part of the SES. Undoubtedly, the boundary be-
tween epistemic and aleatory indeterminism is a fuzzy one, 
even if the extremes are unambiguous. 
Stationarity is the notion that “systems fluctuate within an 
unchanging envelope of variability” (Milly et al., 2008 573). 
It has been a guiding assumption in science, engineering and 
management of natural systems. It refers specifically to ale-
atory indeterminism. Only recently in light of changes ex-
perienced and anticipated for global climate change has this 
assumption been challenged and the search for how to under-
stand and manage non-stationary socioecological systems in-
vigorated. For ecological processes it may be possible to de-
velop models of the underlying changes, and thus develop 
objective probabilities of particular events; this is the goal of 
the large-scale climate modeling efforts (Chandler et al., 2010). 
Objective probabilities (also known as frequentist prob-
abilities) include those derived from observations of events 
(Clark, 2007), estimated from data, or a priori probabilities such 
as those arising from a roll of dice. As did Knight (1921), Burg-
man et al. (1993) defined risk as the objective probability of the 
occurrence of an undesirable outcome. Knight (1921) reserved 
the term “uncertainty” for when objective probabilities can-
not be assigned to potential outcomes. Some environmental 
researchers recognize this distinction but it is not widespread 
(Burgman, 2005). For example, Ludwig et al. (2001) divided 
uncertainty into probabilistic quantities associated with sta-
tistical estimates, and non-probabilistic “radical uncertainty” 
associated with natural catastrophic events and “unforeseen 
consequences of human interventions.” 
In contrast to objective probabilities, we can derive subjec-
tive probabilities from one or more individuals beliefs about 
reality (Clark, 2007). Unlike objective probability, which 
Knight used to distinguish between risk and uncertainty, sub-
jective probability falls into the category of uncertainty as de-
fined by Knight. 
Since different people may well have different beliefs about 
reality, each person may assign a subjective probability to an 
event that differs from someone else. As a result, methods to 
combine belief distributions from multiple people into single 
distributions have been developed (e.g. Rothlisberger et al., 
2010). In addition, Bayesian statistics can be used to combine 
belief distributions with new, objective information (Wade 
2000). An area of active research with profound implications 
for management is developing means to represent uncertainty 
without using subjective probabilities (Burgman, 2005). 
Irreducibility and non-stationarity are aspects of aleatory 
indeterminism and are functions of the inherent character-
istics of the socio-ecological system. In contrast, the determi-
nation of whether objective probabilities exist or don’t exist 
falls into the realm of epistemic indeterminism. It is a func-
tion of what we know or think we know about the SES. Conse-
quently, while irreducibility and non-stationarity are “perma-
nent” attributes of aleatory indeterminism, through our efforts 
to more fully understand SES, our ability to develop objective 
probabilities may improve and how we quantify epistemic in-
determinism may change. 
3. Case studies 
The following three case studies illustrate how the three 
characteristics of indeterminism noted above combine in dif-
ferent fashions to produce challenges all too familiar to those 
who manage socio-ecological systems. We then go on to dis-
cuss the implications of the three characteristics of indetermin-
ism in light of the case studies. 
3.1. Population decline of Hector’s dolphins—Mistreating 
uncertainty as risk 
Our first example of uncertainty comes from Slooten et al.’s 
(2001) calculation of the effect of gillnet mortality on the pop-
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ulation decline of Hector’s dolphins. Hector’s dolphin (Cepha-
lorhynchus hectori) is endemic to New Zealand’s coastal waters. 
Excellent data was available from mark-recapture studies to es-
timate adult survival rate. Therefore, it was possible to calculate 
a probability distribution for the quantity “Adult survival prob-
ability.” In contrast, no data was available for direct estimation 
of first year survival, so the authors used a uniform probabil-
ity distribution with bounds derived from the ratio of juvenile 
to adult survival in studies of two other whale species. This per-
fectly reasonable and well-accepted procedure generates an ex-
tremely precise estimate of juvenile survival with a coefficient 
of variation of 5% despite the complete absence of data. While 
precise, we do not know how accurate the estimate is. 
Equally if not more problematic is the social conflict over 
assigning different subjective probabilities. On one hand, the 
possibility that the subjective probability distribution utilized 
in decision making is overly pessimistic, places an undue bur-
den on the fishing industry to reduce fishing effort to avoid 
gillnet mortality. On the other hand, the possibility that the 
subjective probability distribution utilized is overly optimis-
tic, may lead to a dramatic population decline of Hector’s dol-
phins. Differences of opinion between industry and conserva-
tion groups about the relative contribution of gillnet induced 
mortality compared with other sources of mortality further ex-
acerbate this uncertainty (Conroy et al., 2008). 
3.2. American alligator population fluctuation in Florida 
The American alligator (Alligator mississippiensis) is an apex 
predator endemic to wetlands in the Southern United States. The 
first shift in managing American alligators in Florida occurred 
when the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission closed 
all harvests in 1962 in response to perceived population declines 
during the 1950’s. In 1967, the American alligator became one of 
the first species listed as endangered by the US Fish and Wild-
life Service. A decade later, alligators appeared to be more dan-
gerous and/or much more abundant than they had been previ-
ously, triggering a second shift in management objectives. As a 
result, in the late 1970s the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish 
Commission (GFC) requested that the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service (USFWS) change the status of the Florida pop-
ulation of alligator from endangered to threatened, to enable 
greater management flexibility. The USFWS granted this request 
in 1977, and the GFC immediately initiated an experimental har-
vest of nuisance alligators (Woodward et al., 1987). Over the next 
two decades, GFC expanded experimental commercial and rec-
reational harvests statewide. Until 2004, however, the overall ob-
jectives for the state harvest remained the same: avoid the risk of 
declining populations by reducing the nominal quota whenever 
monitoring indicated that populations were declining. In 2004, 
continued increases in the number of complaints regarding nui-
sance alligators led the GFC to develop the most recent objective 
of keeping populations in a band no more than 25% above or be-
low levels observed in the late 1980s. 
Over the last century, in Florida, there have been three dis-
cernable and conflicting attitudes among the general public 
towards alligators: the desire to hunt alligators, the desire to 
preserve alligators in perpetuity, and fear of alligators. Differ-
ent combinations of these attitudes have resulted in different 
objectives for alligator management at different times. Public 
demand for objectives that match the current dominant atti-
tudes led the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commis-
sion reluctantly to alter its management practices. In the most 
recent period, for example, the fear of alligators determines 
the desired upper limit of the population size for the species, 
while the desire to preserve alligators dictates the lower limit. 
Why did it take more than 30 years to recognize the potential 
for alligator populations to increase and incorporate that knowl-
edge into the harvest objective? One explanation is the differ-
ence in attitude between the “general public” and professional 
resource managers about alligators. Rises in complaints by the 
public about nuisance alligators prompted each of the shifts in 
managing an increasing population of alligators. Yet biologists 
and managers regarded population increases skeptically, since 
they were more averse than the public to the possibility of pop-
ulation decline and its implications than to an increase and its 
implications. In no small part this is a function of socialization 
in managing renewable resources in the late twentieth and early 
twenty first century where the preoccupation is with avoiding 
population extinction (Powell et al., 2010). Scientists and manag-
ers made decisions about harvest regulations primarily by exam-
ining past trends without considering the full range of possible 
futures that could arise. The scientists and managers fell afoul 
of the anchoring problem in decision-making. Anchoring arises 
when historical precedent is weighted more heavily than is war-
ranted by changing circumstances (Hammond et al., 1998). 
3.3. Attempting pallid sturgeon recovery in the Missouri River 
Pallid sturgeon (Scaphirhyncus albus) are large, long-lived 
top carnivores endemic to the Missouri River and Lower Mis-
sissippi River. The US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) listed 
pallid sturgeon as endangered in 1993 based on a perceived re-
duction in distribution, incidental take in commercial fisheries 
for the more abundant shovelnose sturgeon, and loss of hab-
itat caused by the alteration of the natural hydrograph by the 
Missouri Mainstem Reservoir System (USFWS, 1993). In 2000, 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) found that 
water control operations along sections of the Missouri River 
by the US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) jeopardized the 
recovery of the pallid sturgeon and other endangered species. 
Consequently, USFWS required the Corps to increase spring 
flows by 2003 (USFWS, 2000). The need for a more natural hy-
drological regime along the Missouri River was later confirmed 
by a National Academy of Sciences review panel (National Re-
search Council, 2002). Although there was substantial scien-
tific consensus that the modified hydrograph was an issue for 
the persistence of pallid sturgeon, there remained epistemic 
uncertainty about exactly what features of the natural hydro-
graph were necessary (Jacobson and Galat, 2008). In 2003, the 
Corps and USFWS developed an amended biological opinion 
(USFWS, 2003) based on new analyses conducted by the Corps. 
The amended biological opinion required, among many other 
management activities, habitat restoration projects, an inten-
sive and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation program, 
and the formation of a stakeholder group. 
The 2007 Water Resources Development Act created The 
Missouri River Recovery Implementation Committee (MRRIC) 
to recommend recovery actions. MRRIC brings together more 
than seventy representatives of federal agencies, tribes, states, 
local governments and nongovernmental entities in the Mis-
souri River basin and requires them to act consensually. While 
the charter of MRRIC states that the committee will make rec-
ommendations on “[c]hanges to the implementation strategy 
as a result of adaptive management” (USACE, 2008 section 1, 
A, ii, 1, 1), it is unclear how these recommendations will be 
incorporated into management actions on the river. There are 
differing expectations of the extent to which these recommen-
dations will affect day-to-day management of this large, com-
plex, infrastructure defined river system. This compounds 
the reality that members of MRRIC do not necessarily share 
a common underlying goal in addition to disagreeing about 
the best way to achieve any one goal. Without this clarity, one 
challenge will be for the more than seventy representatives to 
develop a shared articulation of the committee’s mission. This 
ambiguity of mission sets the stage for socially induced uncer-
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tainty. This uncertainty is problematic for committee members 
in generating recommendations and for Missouri River man-
agers accountable for day to day operations. The management 
of the Missouri River focuses on meeting the set requirements 
of the 1944 Flood Control Act (FCA); in the past, these require-
ments were widely regarded as unchangeable. Now the Mis-
souri River Authorized Purposes Study (Omnibus Appropri-
ations Act, 2009; Title 1, Section 108), potentially could lead to 
redefining the 1944 FCA requirements. 
4. Discussion of case studies 
While collecting and analyzing data may decrease the indeter-
minism surrounding the population dynamics of Hector’s dol-
phins, American alligators or pallid sturgeons, it will not for 
the deliberations about how to manage them. These case stud-
ies illustrate how three characteristics of indeterminism are 
problematic for management of SES: non-stationarity, irreduc-
ibility, and an inability to define objective probabilities. 
5. Non-stationarity 
While it may be possible to elicit a single belief distribution 
that all stakeholders agree upon, it is by no means guaranteed. 
In the absence of objective probabilities for juvenile survival of 
Hector’s Dolphins, the problem becomes a non-stationary one 
because any stakeholder group can provide a different, subjec-
tive probability for the connections in the model at any time. 
Failing to recognize this source of non-stationarity in the so-
cial component of the SES could lead to surprises, such as hav-
ing management recommendations politically overruled (e.g. 
Conroy et al., 2008). 
Another source of non-stationarity in the social compo-
nents of these case studies arises through the potential for 
shifting objectives in the management regimes. These can be a 
function of changed societal values, which have ramifications 
both for what is investigated about the natural world and the 
extent to which those in management positions find them-
selves surprised by what they have not anticipated. In the case 
of Hector’s dolphins, there is no discussion of the potential for 
shifting objectives. Rather the basis for management is that en-
trenched interests are pursuing constant objectives. For exam-
ple, the commercial gillnetters are committed to ensuring the 
viability of their economic activity necessitated by the consid-
erable investment they have in fishing gear. That managers 
established a new objective after perceived undesirable fluc-
tuations in the population size of American Alligators is indic-
ative of the failure to anticipate non-stationarity. On the Mis-
souri River, the Omnibus study introduces the possibility of 
changing objectives, a heretofore-inconceivable notion. 
There is no guarantee that the future behavior of the SES 
will be like the past. Ignoring the non-stationarity induced 
by social processes increases the possibility of surprise. Un-
der those circumstances, the use of an adaptive management 
rubric provides a way forward if it spurs the development of 
capacity to revise management objectives and to undertake a 
suitably wide range of appropriate actions. 
6. Irreducibility 
While scientists are optimistic that with enough effort epis-
temic uncertainty about the ecological environment may be re-
duced, such optimism may well be misplaced when it comes 
to socially generated uncertainties. No amount of study of the 
social dynamics of any natural resources management regime 
will eliminate this indeterminism. In particular, it would be 
a mistake to confuse the existence of techniques for reducing 
differences in subjective values with the acceptance of their 
results. There is no guarantee that participants in a decision 
making process will agree to be bound by the results of the 
analysis, even if they initiated and/or participated in the pro-
cess. This may be because people’s beliefs change over the de-
liberations or they do not consent to having their values aggre-
gated as part of the process. 
7. Objective probabilities 
The degree to which objective probabilities can quantify 
ecological indeterminism as risk varies among the three case 
studies. Fisheries managers in New Zealand have no data on 
the survival rates of yearling Hector’s dolphins. Consequently, 
they developed a subjective probability distribution. It is in-
appropriate, however, for fisheries managers to use this distri-
bution as an estimate of risk. Using this distribution as an esti-
mate of risk leads to a potentially damaging assumption about 
the amount of gillnet mortality that Hector’s dolphins can tol-
erate without the population declining. 
In contrast, alligator managers in Florida have a large data-
base of knowledge of the biology and life history of the species 
to inform management. Thus, they are able to develop objec-
tive probabilities for most, if not all, ecological quantities rele-
vant to management. Pallid sturgeon are an intermediate case; 
although little was known at the time the Biological Opinion 
was written, since then researchers have developed a great 
deal of objective information. 
All three case studies have socially generated indeterminism 
that cannot be represented with objective probabilities. In the 
cases of the dolphins and sturgeon there are direct negotiations 
between stakeholders with differing values driving the manage-
ment outcomes. In the alligator case, there is no formal process 
for incorporating the general public’s attitudes towards alliga-
tors, and managers are reluctant to shift population size objec-
tives. Nonetheless, when public concern increases to a point 
where it cannot be ignored, managers then revise population 
size objectives. Regardless of the means through which man-
agement decisions incorporate public views, we believe any at-
tempt to use subjective probability to weight possible social out-
comes would be unlikely to reflect public sentiment completely. 
An additional issue arises when there is a need to make 
an explicit tradeoff between competing demands, such as be-
tween conservation of endangered species and commercial 
fishing or navigation. Managers are often reluctant to make 
such tradeoffs overt, and may attribute their reluctance to the 
lack of objective probabilities for ecological quantities. Such 
a rationale shifts the focus from addressing the societal chal-
lenge of deciding which competing demand takes precedence, 
to the technical challenge of estimating an ecological quantity. 
This shift has ramifications for who engages in the manage-
ment process and in what capacity. 
The above case studies illustrate the conundrum that while 
there may be the prospect, however far down the road, of ad-
dressing salient uncertainties associated with the ecological 
system, that prospect leaves the relevant socially induced un-
certainty unresolved. No matter how loud the pleas may be 
from resource managers for a “rational” choice, social dynam-
ics ultimately do not provide deterministic outcomes. All three 
of these characteristics leave the management of socio-ecolog-
ical systems subject to surprises. Frustratingly, once a surprise 
has occurred it will be possible to look back and see the chain 
of arguments, agreements and compromises that led to what 
appeared at the time as unanticipated. 
8. Conclusion 
For adaptive management to address emerging and deep-
ening ecological deficits requires progress in how we address 
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one of the most vexing dimensions of dealing with the fu-
ture—uncertainty. We agree that “[t]he ultimate goal of de-
cision-making in the face of uncertainty should be to reduce 
the undesired impacts from surprises, rather than hoping or 
expecting to eliminate them.” (Walker et al. 2003, 11). Distin-
guishing between ecologically and socially induced uncer-
tainty is a critical first step in acknowledging that source of 
uncertainty matters in managing socio-ecological systems. As 
our examples illustrate, best efforts to address ecologically in-
duced uncertainty is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for managing socio-ecological systems. This recognition has 
implications for our efforts to manage SES adaptively. Adap-
tive managers must expand their traditional focus on reducing 
uncertainty, because socially induced uncertainty is always 
irreducible, non-stationary, and not amenable to the tools of 
probability. As Pritchard and Sanderson (2002 163) note, “If 
management is to be adaptive, it should be focused on how to 
handle irreducible uncertainty, [not just about] how to test hy-
potheses about system function and resilience, [and] how to 
maintain the adaptive capacity of the ecosystem.” 
There is not one monolithic school of thought about how to 
consider the role of indeterminism in adaptive management. 
McFadden et al. (2011) distinguish between the experimental 
resilience school and the decision theoretic school. The exper-
imental resilience school (ER school) makes a strong norma-
tive assumption that building resilience is a key goal of adap-
tive management of SES (Gunderson et al., 1995). It focuses 
on reducing uncertainty by conducting management actions 
in the context of hypothesis tests and experimental design. In 
contrast, the decision theoretic school (DT school) focuses on 
management decisions made in the face of uncertainty (Pos-
singham et al., 2001; Gregory et al., 2006). The DT school, 
while assuming humans generate management objectives that 
represent their values and that these objectives remain con-
stant over the life of at least one iteration of the decision mak-
ing process, does not make normative assumptions about how 
humans come to those objectives or that they must think about 
resilience. In addition, while the potential of management ex-
periments to reduce uncertainty is highly regarded, the DT 
school does not consider experimentation to reduce uncer-
tainty a necessary feature of adaptive management. 
What the two schools of adaptive management agree upon 
is that it essential to learn from the management enterprise 
with the intent of being able to build on that experience in 
the future, in other words, to reduce uncertainty (Gunderson, 
2003). Iteration, however, also creates opportunities to revisit 
objectives without first creating a crisis that forces reactive re-
consideration of objectives. Thus, iteration is a key means of 
dealing with non-stationary and irreducible uncertainty aris-
ing from social processes e an essential part of developing 
adaptive capacity. 
Calls for scientists to do a better job of describing the un-
certainty in data (e.g. McNie, 2007) miss an essential point e 
that there are sources of irreducible uncertainty beyond the 
data that the tools of probability theory cannot describe. Con-
sequently, recognizing socially generated uncertainty is an es-
sential component of practicing adaptive management. 
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